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PROTECTING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST DISINFORMATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM FISA 
JILL I. GOLDENZIEL∗ & MANAL CHEEMA∗∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Protecting national security, especially in a time of crisis, can come at a 
cost to Americans’ civil liberties.  The U.S. government must make difficult 
choices between implementing the strongest possible protections from for-
eign threats and preserving Americans’ constitutional freedoms at home.  Ir-
reparable violations to civil rights can and have occurred from striking the 
wrong balance.1  In a time of indefinite war against unconventional adver-
saries, the balance between protecting national security and preserving civil 
liberties is of utmost importance. 
As the new “endless war” shifts from the war on terror to the infor-
mation domain,2 Congress must enable the United States to fight enemy in-
formation warfare while protecting the rights to privacy and freedom of 
speech and information.3  Congress has had some recent experience crafting 
legislation to balance national security with these constitutional rights: The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).4  FISA, initially passed in 
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 1.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1943) (allowing Japanese 
Americans to be detained because they did not vacate their homes after being excluded by executive 
order). 
 2.  President George W. Bush coined the term “War on Terror” shortly after September 11, 
2001.  Remarks on Arrival at the White House and an Exchange with Reporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1114–16 (Sept. 16, 2001).  The term would come to be used to refer to U.S. military actions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and to fight terrorism all over the world.  As of this writing, American military 
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan is winding down.  Focus has shifted to information warfare.  For 
example, the U.S. Marine Corps established information as a warfighting function in January 2019.  
ROBERT B. NELLER, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, MARINE CORPS BULLETIN 5400 (Jan. 
17, 2019), https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/MCBUL%205400.pdf?ver=2019-02-
06-082807-103. 
 3.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V and amend. IX (privacy); U.S. CONST. amend. I (free speech).   
 4.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001).  
   
2019] PROTECTING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 115 
1978, was modified significantly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  FISA pro-
voked robust debate in the national security community, prompting several 
amendments to its provisions,5 specifically those contained in the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (“FAA”)6 and the FISA Amendments Reauthori-
zation Act of 2017.7 
Lessons learned from debates over FISA can inform legislation that 
would balance national security and First Amendment rights in the fight 
against information warfare.  FISA is an example of Congress’s attempt to 
thread the same needle that any response to foreign disinformation campaigns 
must: allowing surveillance of foreign agents without unduly infringing on 
the First Amendment rights of U.S. persons (“USPERs”).  This Essay will 
argue that FISA can serve as a framework for balancing the government’s 
need to access USPERs’ First Amendment-protected information to combat 
information warfare with USPERs’ constitutional rights.8 
To preserve civil liberties, Congress must ensure that federal agencies 
access USPERs’ First Amendment-protected information solely for narrowly 
tailored national security purposes.9  Congress should mandate that govern-
ment agencies use only open-source data on USPERs whenever sufficient 
open-source data is available and when time permits given the urgency of 
any particular national security concern.10  If an agency cannot meet those 
two requirements without risking its goal(s), Congress should require the 
agency to obtain a court order or warrant to conduct prospective surveillance 
of USPERs’ communications.11 
FISA can serve as a framework for constitutional protections of U.S. 
civil liberties in the context of fighting information warfare.  To sanction 
government surveillance under FISA, a judge must find probable cause that 
                                                        
 5.  See, e.g., Chris Inglis & Jeff Kosseff, In Defense of FAA Section 702: An Examination of 
Its Justification, Operational Employment, and Legal Underpinnings, LAWFARE (Apr. 26, 2016, 
7:31 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/defense-faa-section-702-examination-its-justification-op-
erational-employment-and-legal-underpinnings (arguing in favor of § 702 of the FAA); Faiza Patel 
& Elizabeth Goitein, Fixing the FISA Court by Fixing FISA: A Response to Carrie Cordero, 
LAWFARE (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:18 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/fixing-fisa-court-fixing-fisa-re-
sponse-carrie-cordero (arguing that “FISA became an existential threat to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement in ordinary criminal cases” when the FISC abandoned the “primary purpose 
test”); Benjamin Wittes, Yeah, But Is It a Good Bill? Thoughts on the Leahy FISA Reform Proposal, 
LAWFARE (July 30, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/yeah-it-good-bill-thoughts-leahy-fisa-re-
form-proposal (considering whether proposed Senate reforms were “worth pursuing”).  
 6.  FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436. 
 7.  FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, 132 Stat. 3 (2018) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801) [hereinafter 2017 Amendments]. 
 8.  This Essay expands on our introduction of this argument in the article Jill I. Goldenziel & 
Manal Cheema, The New Fighting Words?: How U.S. Law Hampers the Fight Against Information 
Warfare, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 81, 136–37 (2019).  
 9.  Id. at 48. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
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the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power and/or probable 
cause that the target uses a particular facility.12  The court cannot accept the 
government’s assertion that someone is an agent of a foreign power based 
solely on their First Amendment activities.13  Instead, “a judge may consider 
past activities of the target, as well as facts and circumstances relating to cur-
rent or future activities of the target.”14  However, under FISA Section 702,15 
when the government is surveilling foreign actors overseas, it may inci-
dentally collect information about or communications of USPERs with 
whom potential foreign targets communicate.16 
These First Amendment protections that FISA provides for USPERs can 
be a useful model for legislation to enable the United States to combat infor-
mation warfare, combined with additional safeguards suggested by FISA’s 
critics.  Specifically, to protect the First Amendment, Congress should re-
quire procedures similar to FISA’s when open-source information is unavail-
ing.  First, the government should obtain a court order or warrant under prob-
able cause, based on something more than First Amendment activities.  
Second, where the government incidentally collects the information of 
USPERs, the government should adopt and follow minimization procedures 
to prevent the misuse and retention of that data.  Any legislation relaxing 
surveillance restrictions on USPERs to combat information warfare should 
also be subject to extensive oversight from the Department of Justice, Con-
gress, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), similar to 
the oversight program in place for FISA Section 702.17 
This Essay will proceed in the following parts.  Part I will provide a 
brief overview of the challenges of responding to disinformation campaigns.  
Part II will provide background on the political and legal landscape that drove 
the development of FISA.  Part III will explain how electronic surveillance 
orders are applied for and obtained under FISA and how FISA succeeds and 
fails in providing protections for civil liberties in traditional surveillance and 
Section 702 bulk data surveillance.  Part IV then will discuss how a warrant 
requirement is critical for protecting First and Fourth Amendment interests 
in any surveillance operation.  Finally, Part V will explain how lessons 
                                                        
 12.  50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)–(b) (2012). 
 13.  Id. § 1805(a)(2)(A); see United States v. Aziz, 228 F. Supp. 3d 363 (M.D. Pa. 2017); United 
States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548–51 (E.D. Va. 2006) (finding a judge can rely in part on 
these activities as long as there is probable cause that the target may be involved in unlawful clan-
destine activities). 
 14.  50 U.S.C. § 1805(b).  
 15.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012 & Supp. V 2018).   
 16.  The FISA definition of a USPER is broader than just a U.S. citizen.  Under § 1801(i), a 
USPER is a citizen, a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”), an unincorporated association where a 
substantial number of members are citizens or LPRs, and so on.  50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2012).  
 17.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
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learned from FISA should inform legislation designed to address disinfor-
mation campaigns meant to influence the electoral process. 
A.  The Challenge of Responding to Disinformation Campaigns 
In 2016, Russian actors and other non-USPERs used the informational 
and organizational capabilities of social media to influence the U.S. presi-
dential election.  According to the Intelligence Community Assessment of 
Russian actions, Russia’s interference in the 2016 election was its “[b]oldest 
[y]et,” aimed to “undermine public faith in the U[.]S[.] democratic pro-
cess.”18  Russia is attempting to influence the 2020 election19 with similar 
covert actions intended to “sow division in our society, undermine confi-
dence in our democratic institutions, and otherwise affect political sentiment 
and public discourse to achieve strategic geopolitical objectives.”20 
Russian information campaigns utilized paid advertisements, false sto-
ries, and divisive propaganda to carry out their goals.21  As many as 126 mil-
lion Facebook users, representing almost forty percent of the U.S. population, 
were exposed to content promulgated by Russian actors.22  Social media com-
panies, regulatory agencies, Congress, and the general public continue to de-
bate23 how to curtail foreign interference in the democratic process, preserve 
the integrity of the political process, and retain critical civil liberties protec-
tions. 
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy characterizes the United 
States response to enemy information warfare as “tepid and fragmented.”24  
One reason is that U.S. laws and jurisprudence protecting free speech and 
privacy do not reflect modern technological realities.  First Amendment doc-
trine, the Privacy Act of 1974, and related laws hinder the U.S. response to 
information campaigns.25  In particular, the Privacy Act and other Cold War-
                                                        
 18.  OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT: 
ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS 1, 5 (2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 
 19.  Josh Gerstein, U.S. Brings First Charge for Meddling in 2018 Midterm Elections, 
POLITICO (Oct. 19, 2018, 4:43 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/19/first-criminal-
case-filed-over-russian-interference-in-2018-midterms-916787. 
 20.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL TASK 
FORCE 1 (July 2, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1076696/download; see also Golden-
ziel & Cheema, supra note 8, at 84. 
 21.  Goldenziel & Cheema, supra note 8, at 87. 
 22.  Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelli-
gence, 115th Cong. 13 (2017) (prepared statement of Colin Stretch, General Counsel, Facebook). 
 23.  Once Considered a Boon to Democracy, Social Media Have Started to Look Like Its Nem-
esis, ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/11/04/once-consid-
ered-a-boon-to-democracy-social-media-have-started-to-look-like-its-nemesis. 
 24.  WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 35 
(2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf. 
 25.  Goldenziel & Cheema, supra note 8, at 84. 
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era surveillance laws do not allow the collection of USPERs’ data that would 
adequately enable the government to assess the extent of information cam-
paigns and fight them. 
Laws restricting collection on USPERs need to be relaxed, while still 
maintaining appropriate safeguards for civil liberties, to allow the United 
States to combat enemy information warfare effectively.26  Preserving the 
integrity of the electoral process is a national security interest that itself in-
volves a First Amendment right.  However, legislation must appropriately 
balance this national security interest with other civil liberties concerns. 27  
One mechanism for achieving this balance is reforming surveillance laws to 
allow government agencies to surveil USPERs under a narrowly tailored na-
tional security exception with appropriate constitutional safeguards.28  At the 
same time, legislation must remain flexible enough to allow agencies to move 
“quickly to fight rapid and constantly changing information threats.”29 
Lessons learned from FISA and its amendments, which represent the 
last major attempt to reform surveillance laws for national security purposes, 
are crucial to developing such legislation.  We argue that new legislation 
seeking to combat information warfare must exceed FISA’s protections for 
constitutional liberties to preserve constitutional rights when allowing gov-
ernment surveillance of USPERs. 
B.  Why FISA Came to Be 
Congress enacted FISA in the wake of abuses by the U.S. intelligence 
community that threatened the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.  Two 
events provoked Congress to pass FISA in 1978:30 (1) the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. U.S. District Court (“Keith”),31 and (2) the 
Church Committee reports.32  First, in Keith, the Supreme Court considered 
Fourth Amendment requirements in domestic surveillance cases targeting an 
internal threat.33  “The Keith Court recognized the Executive’s power to ob-
tain intelligence information through electronic surveillance . . . under the 
                                                        
 26.  Id. at 168. 
 27.  Id. at 122. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 135. 
 30.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978). 
 31.  407 U.S. 297 (1972) [hereinafter Keith]. 
 32.  The U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to In-
telligence Activities, formed in 1975, was chaired by Idaho Senator Frank Church and became 
known as the “Church Committee.”  U.S. Senate Historical Office, Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, https://www.senate.gov/artan-
dhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).  The 
committee investigated intelligence abuses by the CIA, FBI, IRS, and other agencies.  Id. 
 33.  407 U.S. at 309.   
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Article II Oath Clause.”34  However, due to the “convergence of First and 
Fourth Amendment values,”35 the Court found that “the Clause, alone, is 
hardly sufficient to support warrantless surveillance merely on the basis of 
the foreign origin of the threat.”36  It also asserted that “Congress may wish 
to consider protective standards for [domestic security surveillance] which 
differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III.”37  The 
Keith decision encouraged the Executive and Congress “to find a legislative 
solution to the problem of warrantless searches.”38 
Second, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the “Church Committee”) described 
the domestic intelligence abuses by intelligence agencies and the military, 
which the executive had rationalized merely as foreign intelligence gather-
ing.39  The Senate created the Committee in the aftermath of Watergate and 
the disclosure of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (“CIA”) domestic and 
covert operations.40  Among other abuses, the Committee investigated the 
CIA’s assassination plots,41 plans by a White House associate counsel to in-
crease intelligence-gathering on Vietnam War protestors and other dissi-
dents,42 covert operations in Angola and Chile,43 President Nixon’s 1969 
warrantless wiretapping of several journals and government employees,44 
and the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) SHAMROCK program.45  In 
considering these events, “[t]he Church Committee found that the [Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”)] internal security and domestic intelligence 
programs compiled massive files on activities protected by the First Amend-
ment and the political opinions of Americans.”46  Between 1975 and 1976, 
                                                        
 34.  William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveil-
lance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 74 (2000) (footnote omitted); see Keith, 407 U.S. at 310.   
 35.  Keith, 407 U.S. at 313.  
 36.  Banks & Bowman, supra note 34, at 74; see Keith, 407 U.S. at 319–20.  
 37.  Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.  
 38.  Banks & Bowman, supra note 34, at 75.  
 39.  S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. II, at 6–7 (1976).  
 40.  Marc B. Langston, Rediscovering Congressional Intelligence Oversight: Is Another 
Church Committee Possible Without Frank Church?, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 433, 436 (2015) (noting 
specifically the 1974 reports by Seymour Hersh in The New York Times).  
 41.  Id. at 458. 
 42.  Id. at 461. 
 43.  Id. at 463. 
 44.  Id. at 464. 
 45.  Id. at 466.  The program involved various private companies providing the NSA with 
Americans’ international telegrams from 1947 to 1975.  Id. at 468. 
 46.  147 CONG. REC. 20,672 (2001); see also Langston, supra note 40, at 474 (describing FBI’s 
2370 actions between 1956 and 1971 to harass dissidents within the United States and the FBI’s 
plot to blackmail Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.).  
   
120 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:114 
the Church Committee published fourteen reports on U.S. intelligence agen-
cies and provided recommendations to address their abuses.47  The reports 
emphasized the absence of explicit congressional or judicial standards in the 
field of surveillance.48  The Church Committee’s disclosures shocked Amer-
icans, causing them to view their own government with new suspicion.49 
As a result of these findings, Congress passed FISA in 1978 to constrain 
and impose judicial review on executive branch surveillance programs.50  
FISA legislation also created the FISC to review FISA applications, allowing 
the government to obtain intelligence while still protecting privacy and indi-
vidual rights.51  FISA was meant to ensure that “electronic surveillance for 
foreign intelligence” comported with the Fourth Amendment.52  The 1978 
Senate Intelligence Report to FISA (“Senate Intelligence Report”) declared 
that Congress did not intend FISA to permit surveillance of lawful activities 
of American citizens, even those activities that are “secret and conducted for 
a foreign power.”53  The Senate Intelligence Report emphasized that individ-
uals retain two freedoms. First, they must be free to communicate with “rep-
resentatives of foreign governments or with foreign groups.”54  Second, they 
must be free from a chilling effect, that is, “free from any fear that such con-
tact might be the basis for probable cause to believe they are acting at the 
direction of a foreign power thus triggering the [g]overnment’s power to con-
duct electronic surveillance.”55 
This legislative history produced by the Senate Intelligence Report, 
which is the most widely accepted interpretation of FISA, makes it clear that 
legal protection extends only to the “lawful exercise of [F]irst [A]mendment 
                                                        
 47.  See Assassination Archives & Research Ctr., Church Committee Reports, http://www.aar-
clibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm (last visited July 13, 2019) (providing links to all 
fourteen reports).  
 48.  Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First 
Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 806–07 
(1989) (describing the Church Committee’s investigation and finding that “warrantless electronic 
surveillance had been used against United States citizens who were not readily identifiable as rea-
sonable sources of foreign intelligence information”); see also Sharon H. Rackow, How the USA 
Patriot Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of 
“Intelligence” Investigations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1666 (2002).  
 49.  Langston, supra note 40, at 474. 
 50.  147 CONG. REC. 20,673 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 51.  Caitlin Thistle, Comment, A First Amendment Breach: The National Security Agency’s 
Electronic Surveillance Program, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1197, 1201–02 (2008); see also ACLU 
Found. of So. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, 
at 15 (1977)). 
 52.  United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).  
 53.  S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 29 (1978). 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id.  
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rights of speech, petition, assembly, and association.”56  The Senate Intelli-
gence Report stated that electronic surveillance might be appropriate if there 
is probable cause to believe that “foreign intelligence services [are] hid[ing] 
behind the cover of some person or organization in order to influence Amer-
ican political events and deceive Americans into believing that the opinions 
or influence are of domestic origin and initiative.”57  The Senate Intelligence 
Report predicted such deception would be “willfully maintained in violation 
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act,” and could thus be prosecuted. 58  
Thus, the Senate Intelligence Report contemplated that activities seeking to 
undermine or “influence American political events,” such as elections, may 
be subject to surveillance, even if they implicate traditional First Amendment 
activities.59 
II.  THE FRAMEWORK OF FISA 
FISA authorizes four investigative activities: (1) electronic surveil-
lance;60 (2) physical searches;61 (3) pen register and trap and trace surveil-
lance;62 and (4) business records.63  This Essay focuses on electronic surveil-
lance, as defined in Section 1801(f), which is the primary method for 
surveillance to prevent and combat disinformation campaigns. 
                                                        
 56.  Id. (emphasis added).  The 1978 Senate Judiciary Committee report and the House Intelli-
gence Committee report on FISA seem to contradict the Senate Intelligence report.  The Judiciary 
Committee report states that activities protected by the First Amendment may not “form any part 
of the basis” for identifying a FISA target.  See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 23 (1977) (“In no event may 
lawful political activity within the ambit of the protections afforded by the first amendment be the 
basis, or form any part of the basis, for finding that any individual is engaged in ‘clandestine intel-
ligence activities.’”).  Likewise, the House Intelligence Committee Report emphasized that FISA 
“would not authorize surveillance of ethnic Americans who lawfully gather political information 
and perhaps even lawfully share it with the foreign government of their national origin.”  See In re 
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 739 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (emphasis added) (quoting H. REP. NO. 95-
1283, at 40 (1978)).   
 57.  S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 29 (1978). 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. 
 60.  50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–12 (2012); see id. § 1801(f)(1)–(4) (defining the four categories of 
electronic surveillance under FISA). 
 61.  Id. §§ 1821–29.  Congress amended FISA in 1994 to authorize physical searches of the 
“premises, property, information or material of a foreign power or agent of a foreign power” in the 
United States, conducted for the purpose of collecting “foreign intelligence information.”  Intelli-
gence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, sec. 302(b), § 1882, 108 Stat. 
3423, 3445 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1822 (2012)). 
 62.  50 U.S.C. §§ 1842–46. 
 63.  Id. §§ 1861–62.  In 1998, Congress amended FISA to permit FBI use of pen registers and 
trap and trace devices and authorized FISA surveillance of business records.  Intelligence Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, sec 402, § 1842, 112 Stat. 2396, 2405 (1998) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012)). 
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A.  Requesting and Obtaining Order 
Section 1804(a)(1) through (9) describes the required contents of an ap-
plication to conduct electronic surveillance under FISA.  A federal officer 
must apply for a court order from the FISC, in writing and under oath, which 
must be approved by the Attorney General (“AG”).64  The application must 
identify or describe the specific target, and the AG must find that standard 
investigation cannot reasonably obtain the information.65  In a FISA applica-
tion, a federal officer must: (1) provide statements of facts and circumstances 
that justify the officer’s belief that the person is a foreign power or an agent 
of a foreign power;66 (2) list the facilities or places that the target is allegedly 
using;67 and (3) describe the nature of the information and types of commu-
nication sought.68 
At a minimum, the application must allow the FISC to find probable 
cause that the target is a “[f]oreign power”69 or an “[a]gent of a foreign 
power.” 70  The terms “[f]oreign power” and “[a]gent of a foreign power” 
                                                        
 64.  50 U.S.C. § 1804(a). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. § 1804(a)(3)(A). 
 67.  Id. § 1804(a)(3)(B). 
 68.  Id. § 1804(a)(5). 
 69.  Id. § 1801(a). 
“Foreign power” means— 
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the 
United States;  
. . . . 
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor; 
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of [USPERs]; [or] 
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments . . . . 
Id. 
 70.  Id. § 1801(b).  
“Agent of a foreign power” means— 
(1) any person other than a [USPER], who— 
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power . . . 
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence 
activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the 
circumstances of such person’s presence in the United States indicate that such person 
may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids 
or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any 
person to engage in such activities; [or] 
 . . . . 
(2) any person who— 
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of 
a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal stat-
utes of the United States; 
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power, 
knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such 
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ensure the international nexus necessary to fall under FISA’s jurisdiction.  
Within the definition of “[a]gent of a foreign power,” there is a “knowingly” 
requirement when a USPER is the proposed target, thereby heightening the 
standard for finding that a USPER is an agent.71  In other words, the govern-
ment would have to prove that the USPER knowingly acted for or on behalf 
of a foreign power, whereas the government would not need to make a show-
ing of mens rea for a non-USPER. 
To receive a FISA order, the government must have the “significant pur-
pose” to obtain foreign intelligence information (“FII”) from the surveil-
lance.72  The definition of FII is broad, and the standard for FII collection 
further depends on whether the information concerns a USPER.73  FII is in-
formation that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against 
actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts;74 sabotage or interna-
tional terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction;75 or clandestine intelligence activities by or of a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power.76  On the one hand, if the information sought 
does not concern a USPER, the information must only relate to these activi-
ties.77  On the other hand, if the information involves a USPER, the infor-
mation collected must be necessary to (a) the national defense or security of 
the United States78 or (b) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United 
States.79  Russian disinformation is likely to fall into the catch-all language 
regarding security and foreign affairs.80 
Fundamentally, the “significant purpose” requirement protects against 
abuse of FII collection.  In other words, the “sole objective” in the collection 
                                                        
foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal 
statutes of the United States; [or] 
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in 
preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; . . . .   
Id. 
 71.  Id.; see United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Section 1801(b), for 
example, makes a [USPER] an agent of a foreign power only if he ‘knowingly’ engaged in certain 
activities; the [S]ection contains no knowledge requirement with respect to non-[USPERs].”). 
 72.  50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B).  The USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to state that acquisi-
tion of FII need only be a significant purpose, rather than the primary purpose, of the surveillance.  
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 218, 115 Stat. 
272, 291 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B) (2012)). 
 73.  Id. § 1801(e). 
 74.  Id. § 1801(e)(1)(A). 
 75.  Id. § 1801(e)(1)(B). 
 76.  Id. § 1801(e)(1)(C). 
 77.  Id. § 1801(e)(1)–(2). 
 78.  Id. § 1801(e)(2)(A). 
 79.  Id. § 1801(e)(2)(B). 
 80.  Id. § 1801(e)(2).  
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of FII may not be “merely to gain evidence of past criminal conduct” to pun-
ish the agent of a foreign power.81  FISA requires a high-ranking executive 
branch official to certify that: (1) the information sought is FII; (2) a “signif-
icant purpose” of the surveillance or search is to obtain FII; and (3) normal 
investigative techniques cannot reasonably obtain such information.82 
Membership in or activities in support of an organization—even one 
that advocates violence—are protected First Amendment activities.83  Under 
FISA and the First Amendment, a proposed target’s mere association with 
terrorist groups cannot justify surveillance.  Instead, the government must 
establish probable cause that a prospective target intentionally acted to fur-
ther terrorist activities.84 
FISA’s high standards for the collection of information on USPERs can 
serve as a model for creating legislation that would allow domestic surveil-
lance of USPERs.  Requiring an application for a court order from FISC, and 
heightened requirements for collection on USPERs, would preserve consti-
tutional rights.  As discussed below, requiring a warrant would better protect 
civil liberties.85  However, a warrant requirement may not always be practical 
in light of urgent national security concerns. 
B.  FISA’s Protections for Civil Liberties 
Beyond certification, FISA places additional restrictions on surveillance 
that seek to balance national security and First Amendment rights, namely, 
minimization procedures and a prohibition on surveilling a USPER solely 
based on First Amendment activities.  In particular, FISA imposes limitations 
on how non-public information regarding non-consenting USPERs may be 
used, requires a FISC judge to review the adequacy of proposed minimization 
procedures, and limits the use of First Amendment information of a proposed 
target. 
First, to reduce the risk that surveillance might interfere with the rights 
of USPERs, FISA imposes limitations on the acquisition, retention, and dis-
semination of non-public information regarding non-consenting USPERs.86  
                                                        
 81.  See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).  But to the extent that 
obtaining FII is in part influenced by law enforcement interests, FII collection and criminal prose-
cution functions may overlap.  50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(e), 1804, 1823(e). 
 82.  50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6).  
 83.  See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (acknowledging 
Senate report notes, which stated that the purpose of FISA was to strike a balance between the need 
for surveillance and the protection of civil liberties), judgment aff’d without opinion, 729 F.2d 1444 
(2d Cir. 1983) and judgment aff’d on other grounds, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 84.  See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 23, 27–28, 47 (1977) (clarifying that the probable cause standard 
is the same as in the traditional criminal context and that the Government must “establish[] probable 
cause that each and every element of [the status of agent of a foreign power] exists”). 
 85.  See infra Section II.D. 
 86.  50 U.S.C. § 1806 (allowing the use of information acquired from electronic surveillance 
concerning USPERs where certain minimization procedures are followed, (e.g., notification to the 
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Non-public information concerning a USPER may be disseminated without 
that person’s consent only if the person’s “identity is necessary to understand 
the [FII] or assess its importance.”87  Specifically, the AG must promulgate 
“minimization procedures” that are “reasonably designed” to minimize ac-
quisition and retention and prohibit dissemination to avoid over-collection 
and misuse.88 
Minimization procedures vary depending on the context: the type of in-
telligence collection at issue, the agencies involved, and the nature of the tar-
get.89  For traditional FISA electronic surveillance, minimization occurs at 
the retention and dissemination stages.90  If information is neither FII nor 
evidence of a crime, the reviewing agent will minimize information collec-
tion by discarding, erasing, or omitting the information in the indexing log.91  
And, before dissemination, the reviewing agent must redact all USPERs’ 
names and personal identifiers, except when “such person’s identity is nec-
essary to understand [FII] or assess its importance” or is evidence of a 
crime.92 
Minimization procedures for bulk data collections under Section 702 are 
more stringent.93  The procedures place limits on who may access Section 
702-acquired information and on the use of “sensitive information,” such as 
“religious[,] academic, political, or highly personal” information and medical 
information.94  For upstream collection, or collection of communications 
from fiber cables and infrastructure,95 the FISC imposes additional proce-
dures, such as “restrict[ing] access to databases most likely to contain wholly 
domestic communications,” requiring the information to be purged from the 
                                                        
aggrieved person, permitting motions to suppress, and requiring the destruction of unintentionally 
acquired information, with exceptions)).  
 87.  Id. § 1801(h)(2). 
 88.  Id. § 1801(h)(1).  
 89.  Emily Berman, Digital Searches, the Fourth Amendment, and the Magistrates’ Revolt, 68 
EMORY L.J. 49, 72 (2018). 
 90.  Id. at 73.  Retention is where the information is decoded, translated, or otherwise made 
readable.  Id.  
 91.  In re All Matters Submitted to FISA, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 618 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated 
on other grounds by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 92.  50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(2), 1821(4)(B); In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 618. 
 93.  Berman, supra note 89, at 75. 
 94.  Id. at 76; see also LORETTA E. LYNCH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MINIMIZATION 
PROCEDURES USED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH 
ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 4 (2016), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/docu-
ments/icotr/51117/2016_FBI_Section_702_Minimization_Procedures_Sep_26_2016_part_1_and_
part_2_merged.pdf (enumerating the limitations on the FBI’s acquisition of communications in line 
with Section 702(b)). 
 95.  James Bamford, They Know Much More Than You Think, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 15, 
2013), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/08/15/nsa-they-know-much-more-you-think/. 
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system, permanently tagging the information as “upstream” to alert its sensi-
tive nature, and limiting retention to two years.96 
Second, a FISC judge must sign off on proposed minimization proce-
dures and deem them consistent with the need to obtain, produce, and dis-
seminate FII.97  Every FISC order incorporates these minimization proce-
dures.  FISC may also require supplemental procedures in certain 
circumstances,98 and the government may request modifications to the pro-
cedures.99  FISA also contemplates that minimization can occur later in the 
process of reviewing the communications.100 
Third, and finally, the FISC cannot accept the government’s assertion 
that a USPER is an agent of a foreign power “solely” based on activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment.101  Instead, the judge “may consider past ac-
tivities of the target, as well as facts and circumstances relating to current or 
future activities of the target.”102  However, if the government has probable 
cause to believe the target may also be involved with or knowingly aiding or 
abetting unlawful clandestine activities, the FISC may authorize surveillance 
even if the target is engaged in First Amendment activities.103  As a federal 
district court ruled, a target’s involvement in protected First Amendment ac-
tivities does not bar electronic surveillance under FISA.104 
                                                        
 96.  Berman, supra note 89, at 76–77.  For an explanation on how the NSA’s upstream collec-
tion program obtains wholly domestic communications and the FISC’s consideration of how NSA’s 
targeting and minimizing procedures comport with the Fourth Amendment, see generally 
[REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], 2011 WL 10945618, at *1, *15–17, *23–28 (FISA Ct. 
Oct. 3, 2011) (discussing NSA’s targeting procedures and how NSA’s upstream collection program 
collects wholly domestic communications,  the minimization framework does not meet FISA, and 
the minimization and targeting procedures do not satisfy the Fourth Amendment). 
 97.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (outlining required minimization procedures).  
 98.  See, e.g., In re All Matters Submitted to FISA, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 618–19 (FISA Ct. 
2002) (noting the legislative history that suggests a FISC judge has “discretionary power to modify 
the order”).  
 99.   Id. at 619 (describing how the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General “aug-
mented” and “expanded” procedures governing contacts between FBI and Department of Justice  
(“DOJ”) attorneys during FISA surveillance).  
 100.  Inherent in the concept of retention, an agency can obtain raw FISA-acquired information 
that needs to be evaluated for whether it contains FII, information necessary to understand or assess 
FII, or evidence of a crime.  See LYNCH, supra note 94, at 5.  The FBI then conducts minimization 
procedures, such as striking personal identifiers, from the raw FISA-acquired information.  Id. at 9.  
Raw FISA-acquired information, that is, information the FBI obtained but must still review, can 
only be held for five years, unless the agency determines an extension is necessary.  Id. at 22.  
 101.  United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (E.D. Va. 2006) (explaining a judge can 
rely in part on these activities as long as there is probable cause that the target may be involved in 
unlawful clandestine activities).  
 102.  50 U.S.C. § 1805(b).  
 103.  Rosen, 447 F. Supp. at 549–50. 
 104.  Id. 
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C.  Court Orders and Section 702 Surveillance 
Alongside the procedural and substantive requirements embedded in 
FISA, the Fourth Amendment, specifically the warrant requirement, also pro-
tects USPERs from improper surveillance under FISA.  If surveillance inten-
tionally targets a USPER, even if they are reasonably believed to be abroad, 
the traditional probable cause and warrant analyses are required.105  However, 
with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (“FAA”), Congress distinguished 
procedures for targeting non-USPERs outside the United States,106 collecting 
FII inside the United States targeting USPERs outside the United States,107 
and collecting FII by targeting USPERs outside the United States.108  The 
enactment of the FAA affected how the probable cause and warrant analyses 
would apply, if at all, to the three categories. 
The FAA had two primary goals.  First, “Congress wanted to provide a 
sound statutory framework, consistent with the Constitution” that would en-
able the targeting of those abroad and, at the same time, afford additional 
protections to USPERs “whose communications are targeted for collection 
or collected incidentally.”109  For example, the FAA prevents the government 
from targeting USPERs overseas without an individualized warrant, as had 
been possible before.110  Second, Congress “wanted to provide civil immun-
ity” for service providers who assisted the intelligence community.111 
The FAA preserves the principle of relying on the location of the poten-
tial target of surveillance and their USPER status as a basis for regulating 
intelligence collection.  But unlike the practice with traditional FISA appli-
cations, the FAA does not require the government to obtain a FISC order 
identifying the facilities, telephone lines, e-mail addresses, places, or prop-
erty where any surveillance will be directed.  For programmatic surveillance, 
the FAA eliminated the requirement for the government to show probable 
cause that the target of surveillance was a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power. 
Sections 702, 703, and 704 of the FAA cover collection on USPERs and 
non-USPERs outside the United States.  First, Section 702 provides proce-
dures for targeting non-USPERs abroad.112  The AG and the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence (“DNI”) may authorize, for up to one year, targeting of 
                                                        
 105.  50 U.S.C. §§ 1881b(c)(1)(B), 1881c(c)(1)(B).  
 106.  Id. § 1881a. 
 107.  Id. § 1881b. 
 108.  Id. § 1881c. 
 109.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 14 (2012) [hereinafter OIG REPORT], 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/o1501.pdf. 
 110.  Id. at 14–15. 
 111.  Id. at 15. 
 112.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a. 
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non-USPERs reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, 
subject to approved targeting and minimization procedures.113  Section 702 
is limited to determining whether targeting and minimization procedures 
comply with the statute and the Fourth Amendment.114  It establishes a sys-
tem with oversight for U.S. internet service providers to respond to govern-
ment requests for information on foreign people believed to be located over-
seas and associated with foreign intelligence topics.  Section 702 does not 
permit the intelligence community to target a USPER anywhere in the 
world115 but permits incidental collection on USPERs, subject to minimiza-
tion and use rules.116 
Next, Section 703 regulates collection inside the United States that tar-
gets USPERs outside the United States.117  It applies when the assistance of 
a provider is required to target the USPER.118  Applications made to the FISC 
must describe the techniques used,119 but do not have to specify the targeted 
facilities.120  Additionally, a USPER overseas may be targeted under this Sec-
tion if they meet the description of an agent of a foreign power in Title 50, 
section 1801(b)(2) of the United States Code or if they are officers or em-
ployees of a foreign power.121  Section 703 contains a seven-day emergency 
provision.122  Specifically, if an applicant can obtain an order under normal 
circumstances, but “an emergency situation exists” that requires the acquisi-
tion of FII, the AG can authorize the acquisition if a judge is informed at the 
time of authorization and an application is made to the FISC within seven 
days.123 
Finally, Section 704 describes acquisitions targeting USPERs outside 
the United States.124  It provides for FISC jurisdiction over the targeting of 
                                                        
 113.  Id. § 1805(d)(1). 
 114.  Id. § 1881a (among other subsections, subsection (b) provides limitations on acquisitions, 
subsection (d) explains targeting procedures, subsection (e) provides minimization procedures, sub-
section (f) requires the Attorney General to adopt guidelines “consistent with the [F]ourth [A]mend-
ment” and limits FBI access to certain communications, subsection (g) explains the Attorney Gen-
eral’s certification requirements, and subsections (h), (i), and (j) provide for judicial review).   
 115.  Id. § 1881a(b)(3).  
 116.  In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105b of FISA, 551 F.3d 1004, 1015 (FISA 
Ct. Rev. 2008) (noting that “incidental collections occurring as a result of constitutionally permis-
sible acquisitions do not render those acquisitions unlawful”).  
 117.  50 U.S.C. § 1881b. 
 118.  Id. § 1881b(c)(5)(B). 
 119.  Id. § 1881b(b)(1)(G). 
 120.  Id. § 1881b(b)(1)(H). 
 121.  Id. § 1881b(c)(1)(B)–(C). 
 122.  Id. § 1881b(d)(1). 
 123.  Id. § 1881b(d)(1)(A). 
 124.  Id. § 1881c. 
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USPERs reasonably believed to be located overseas when the collection oc-
curs outside the United States.125  Applications need not specify the tech-
niques or targeted facilities.126  A USPER overseas may be targeted under 
this Section if they meet the description of an agent of a foreign power in 
section 1801(b)(2) or if they are officers or employees of a foreign power. 127 
Like Section 703, it contains a seven-day emergency provision.128 
FISA authority for electronic surveillance of USPERs may not exceed 
ninety days.129  The government must obtain approval from the FISC for an 
additional authorization, not to exceed ninety days.130  For non-USPERs, the 
surveillance authority may be granted for up to 120 days and up to one year 
upon renewal of the application if the FISC has probable cause to believe that 
no communications of any individual USPER will be acquired during the 
renewal period.131  Renewals are unlimited so long as the government can 
continue to show the FISC that the government has probable cause to believe 
the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and the target 
still uses or is about to use the targeted facilities.132 
The FAA represents improved protections for constitutional liberties 
when conducting surveillance.  With the Act, Congress made clear that 
USPERs require additional protections that are not necessary for non-
USPERs and clarified other protections required for USPERs.  In particular, 
the seven-day emergency requirement in Sections 703 and 704 creates a bal-
ance between the flexibility needed to address urgent national security con-
cerns with safeguards for constitutional rights. 
D.  Protections on Bulk Data Collection 
The FAA and the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 
(“2017 Amendments”) also limit surveillance authorities, especially under 
Section 702.  FISA primarily structures limitations on surveillance around 
what is known at the time of acquisition.133  First, surveillance “may not in-
tentionally target any person known . . . to be located in the United States.”134  
Second, surveillance “may not intentionally target a person reasonably be-
lieved to be located outside the United States if the purpose . . . is to target 
                                                        
 125.  Id. § 1881c(a).  
 126.  Id. § 1881c(b) (omitting mention of needing to specify techniques or targeted facilities in 
the application).  
 127.  Id. § 1881c(b)(3)(B). 
 128.  Id. § 1881c(d)(1). 
 129.  Id. § 1805(d)(1). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. § 1805(d)(2).  
 133.  Id. § 1881a(b). 
 134.  Id. § 1881a(b)(1). 
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a . . . person reasonably believed to be in the United States.”135  Third, sur-
veillance “may not intentionally target a [USPER] reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States.”136  That said, under the 2017 Amend-
ments, surveillance may target a person to gather foreign intelligence without 
a separate FISC order if the AG has authorized “the emergency employment 
of electronic surveillance or a physical search.”137  Fourth, the surveillance 
“may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender 
and all intended recipients are known . . . to be located in the United 
States.”138  Finally, all surveillance must be “consistent with the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment.”139  In addition to these limitations, the FBI cannot access the 
contents of Section 702-acquired communications without a court order. 140  
To be precise, the FBI cannot retrieve information obtained “pursuant to a 
query made using a [USPER] query term” if its query “was not designed to 
find and extract [FII]” but instead is performed “in connection with a predi-
cated criminal investigation” unrelated to national security.141 
The FBI and NSA are the only agencies authorized to acquire FII under 
Section 702.142  The FBI may only use USPERs’ information collected under 
Section 702 as evidence in a criminal proceeding if the agency obtains a court 
order or if the criminal proceeding involves one of the items on an enumer-
ated list of conduct.143  The FBI must also review the sufficiency of the 
NSA’s explanation for its reasonable belief that the account’s user is outside 
of the United States.144  Finally, the FBI must review and evaluate the suffi-
ciency of the NSA-provided information that the person to be targeted is a 
non-USPER.145 
Although collections under Section 702 do not require warrants, Section 
702 includes many protections for constitutional liberties.  Congress clarifies 
restrictions on collection on USPERs.  The amendments to FISA also impose 
important certification requirements for these modes of surveillance to pro-
tect constitutional liberties.146  First, the AG and DNI must certify to the FISC 
                                                        
 135.  Id. § 1881a(b)(2). 
 136.  Id. § 1881a(b)(3). 
 137.  2017 Amendments, supra note 7, at 132 Stat. 13.  Under this emergency exception, the 
Attorney General may authorize electronic surveillance where they “reasonably determine[]” that 
surveillance is required “to obtain [FII] before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due 
diligence can be obtained.”  50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1)(A). 
 138.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(4). 
 139.  Id. § 1881a(b)(5). 
 140.  2017 Amendments, supra note 7, at sec. 101, 132 Stat. 4.  
 141.  Id. 
 142.  OIG REPORT, supra note 109, at xiii.  For the CIA to participate, it must submit its targeting 
request to the NSA.  Id. 
 143.  See id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at xv. 
 146.  2017 Amendments, supra note 7137, at sec. 101, 132 Stat. 4. 
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that acquisitions under the program will meet the targeting objectives and 
limitations under section 1881a.147  Second, they must certify that the acqui-
sitions will satisfy traditional FISA minimization procedures.148  Finally, the 
certification must reflect that the AG adopted guidelines that meet the statu-
tory procedures, the targeting and minimization procedures and guidelines do 
not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that a significant purpose of the pro-
grammatic collection is to obtain FII.149 
Finally, and importantly, the 2017 Amendments require the release of 
information on the breakdown of U.S. and non-USPER targets of electronic 
surveillance.  The FBI must also disclose to the public the number of in-
stances it opened “an investigation of a [USPER] (who is not considered a 
threat to national security) based wholly or in part on an acquisition” of the 
information under Section 702.150  The DNI and AG must annually release a 
declassified version of the minimization procedures that apply to the handling 
of USPER information collected under Section 702.151  The AG must also 
report the number of subjects targeted either under an order or under an emer-
gency authorization, and the number of those targeted who are USPERs.152  
This report must be unclassified “to the extent consistent with national secu-
rity” and publicly available.153  Section 702 surveillance is subject to regular 
review by the Justice Department, the Office of the Director of National In-
telligence (“ODNI”), Congress, and FISC.154  NSA employees also receive 
extensive training on Section 702 to minimize abuses.155 
To summarize, the Section 702 program is highly valuable but also 
highly constrained and monitored.  The Fourth Amendment is a fundamental 
limitation on collections of USPERs’ data, whether intentional or incidental.  
In particular, the warrant requirement, minimization procedures, and report-
ing requirements that promote transparency—as adopted at various levels 
                                                        
 147.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g) (2012). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id.  
 150.  2017 Amendments, supra note 7137, at sec 102, 132 Stat. at 9. 
 151.  Id. at sec. 104, 132 Stat. 13. 
 152.  Id. at sec. 102, 132 Stat. 9.  According to the DOJ, during 2018, the government filed 1081 
applications for authority to conduct electronic surveillance.  Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to The Honorable James 
C. Duff, Director, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, (May 3, 2019) (on file with authors).  The 
FISC approved 1079 applications.  According to the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, which reports the number of proposed applications, the government filed 1142 applications 
and 830 were granted, 245 were modified, 40 were denied in part, and 27 were denied in full.  The 
total number of persons targeted for electronic surveillance was between 1500 and 1999 and the 
aggregate number of USPERs targeted was between 0 and 499.  Id. 
 153.  2017 Amendments, supra note 7137, at sec. 107, 132 Stat. at 14. 
 154.  CHRIS INGLIS & JEFF KOSSEFF, IN DEFENSE OF FAA SECTION 702, 15–19 (2016), 
www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/ingliskosseff_defenseof702_final_v3_digi-
tal.pdf.  
 155.  Id. at 16–17.  
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throughout FISA—protect civil liberties, including the First Amendment.  
Again, these provisions could serve as a model for creating legislation that 
would allow surveillance to combat disinformation campaigns designed to 
influence the electoral process.  Similar warrant requirements, minimization 
procedures, and reporting requirements would protect Fourth and First 
Amendment rights. 
III.  FISA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Surveillance will always implicate the First Amendment because of its 
potential to create a chilling effect on speech or impose associational burdens.  
FISA surveillance, in particular, has faced many First Amendment chal-
lenges, and Congress has reformed it to assuage these concerns.156  Generally, 
if a warrant names accounts of foreign powers or agents disseminating or 
engaging in disinformation, a FISC may authorize the collection of their com-
munications metadata.157  That the government can intercept communica-
tions of foreign nationals believed to be outside the United States buttresses 
this point.158  For example, an acquisition order could, in theory, seek all tel-
ephone and e-mail communications to and from countries of foreign policy 
interest, like Russia.  That could include communications to and from 
USPERs. 
However, if the government is surveilling for Russian disinformation, 
critics might raise concerns that the government could pretextually target a 
USPER for an expressed political view that aligns with disinformation tac-
tics.  Thus, a person may be chilled from stating their actual beliefs for fear 
of government intervention.159  This section analyzes how FISA and the de-
bate surrounding it can provide lessons learned for legislation to combat in-
formation warfare. 
A.  First Amendment Rights 
Generally, to justify interference with First Amendment rights, the gov-
ernment must have a compelling state interest, narrowly tailored to achieve 
                                                        
 156.  See, e.g., United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that sur-
veillance of U.S. citizens engaged in terrorist activities does not violate the First Amendment); 
United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), judgment aff’d without opinion, 729 
F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 157.  See, e.g., United States v. Aldawsari, 740 F.3d 1015 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Squil-
lacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant was an agent of a foreign power 
and electronic surveillance was legal).  But see United States v. Missick, 875 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 
1989) (finding that the defendant was not an agent of a foreign power such that FISA would apply).  
 158.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).  
 159.  Cf. Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After 
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 
299–300 (2002). 
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its stated purpose.  Some have questioned whether combatting efforts de-
signed to undermine the electoral process is a clear enough national security 
interest to justify infringing on USPERs’ First Amendment rights.160  As the 
Keith Court stated, freedom of speech is placed in danger “where the 
[g]overnment attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect 
‘domestic security.’”161  Justifying surveillance on a so-called “national se-
curity interest” would be similarly vague without careful elaboration. 
B.  The Success of First Amendment Claims Under FISA 
It is hard for an individual to make a successful claim that surveillance 
authorized by FISA violated their First Amendment rights.  High potential 
for the abuse of First Amendment rights may exist when the executive branch 
alone makes national security surveillance decisions.162  The FISC tends to 
reject any First Amendment objections or fails to mention them.163  Argu-
ments raised in other federal courts that challenge surveillance programs un-
der the First Amendment also tend to fail.164 
First, where surveillance, under FISA, does not directly target a USPER, 
courts have held that USPERs have no legal claim or concern  under the First 
Amendment caveat, which prohibits probable cause determinations from be-
ing made solely on a proposed target’s First Amendment activities,165 as the 
First Amendment caveat does not apply to non-USPERs.166  In ACLU Foun-
dation of Southern California v. Barr,167 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia affirmed a district court order upholding the le-
gality of surveillance of nonresident aliens (non-USPERs), except for the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim.168  According 
to the court, only two of the eight alien plaintiffs were permanent resident 
aliens that would qualify as USPERs.169 Thus, the First Amendment caveat 
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only applied to those two plaintiffs.170  However, the court noted “the gov-
ernment may be violating the First Amendment when it investigates someone 
because it dislikes the person’s political views,”171 and because the First 
Amendment does apply to non-resident aliens to some extent, that may be a 
basis for constitutional concern regarding all the plaintiffs, including non-
USPERs.172  Thus, if the target of the surveillance is a USPER or the target’s 
activities are protected by the First Amendment, a wiretap will violate FISA 
if the target is labeled as a foreign power based solely on the target’s First 
Amendment activities.173 
Second, the government is allowed to rely in part on First Amendment 
activities in its application requesting surveillance, and the FISC is allowed 
to rely in part on First Amendment activities in permitting surveillance.  In 
United States v. Rahim,174 the defendant argued that “the FISA evidence was 
obtained solely on the basis of his protected First Amendment activities.”175  
The court looked to precedent from other districts176 to determine that “while 
Rahim may have been engaged in some protected First Amendment activi-
ties, these activities were not the sole basis underlying that determination.”177  
Because the FISC judge could find probable cause that the target of the sur-
veillance was an agent of a foreign power through considering other non-
speech or association activities, the court found Rahim’s argument to be mer-
itless.178  Extending Rahim, in United States v. Kokayi,179 the court found that 
a target’s First Amendment activities may contribute to a probable cause de-
termination if the target engaged in otherwise prohibited activities.  In Ko-
kayi, the defendants alleged that “the FISA applications may have been im-
properly predicated on protected First Amendment activities.”180  The court, 
however, disagreed.181  Instead, it asserted, “the probable cause determina-
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tion may rely in part on activities protected by the First Amendment, pro-
vided the determination also relies on activities not protected by the First 
Amendment.”182  Thus, a court may consider an individual’s protected First 
Amendment activities so long as additional evidence of prohibited activities 
exists.183 
Finally, First Amendment claims often fail under FISA because defend-
ants do not always allege a proper First Amendment violation, such as a 
chilling effect.  For the First Amendment to invalidate a practice, the govern-
ment’s action must harm a person because of their protected speech.184  The 
mere assertion that speech or association will potentially be chilled is not 
sufficient to support a First Amendment claim.185  An unconstitutional 
chilling effect exists where the government’s actions are “regulatory, pro-
scriptive, or compulsory in nature.”186  Three cases, Laird v. Tatum,187 Clap-
per v. Amnesty International USA,188 and United States v. Falvey,189 provide 
the parameters of success for chilling effect claims under FISA.  Because 
FISA forces the government to meet specific standards before an order based 
on an individual’s First Amendment activities can be issued, courts have yet 
to find FISA’s provisions so overly broad that they chill an individual’s First 
Amendment rights.190 
In Laird v. Tatum, the Court found the plaintiff’s claim non-justiciable 
as the “allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a 
claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future 
harm.”191  The plaintiffs did not present evidence of illegal surveillance prac-
tices.192  Similarly, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Court de-
nied standing to plaintiffs who alleged actual and threatened harm from sur-
veillance conducted under Section 702.193  However, the plaintiffs did not 
show a realistic threat of imminent injury.194  Under Section 702, the govern-
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ment can monitor foreign communications without a showing of individual-
ized suspicion, even if that program incidentally collects communications of 
USPERs.195 
In United States v. Falvey, the defendants, accused of supporting the 
Irish Republican Army (“IRA”), claimed FISA violated the First Amendment 
by allowing the government to engage in politically motivated surveil-
lance.196  Further, the defendants asserted that surveillance would create a 
chilling effect where people would be afraid to express their sympathies for 
certain groups because the government would then invade their privacy under 
FISA.197  However, the court held that FISA, on its face, is neither overbroad 
nor unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, as it did not create a 
chilling effect.198  The Court found it important that the FISC—and not the 
executive branch—made the finding that a target is an agent of a foreign 
power.  The Court reasoned that a judicial determination, rather than an ex-
ecutive one, protects against abusive political surveillance.199  Further, the 
Court noted that FISA prevents the executive from determining that someone 
is an agent of a foreign power solely based on protected First Amendment 
activities.200  The court went on to assert that the First Amendment does not 
protect the IRA’s acts of intimidating and coercing the civilian population 
and government, but more importantly, that these actions are “legitimately 
encompassed by FISA.”201  Accordingly, “the defendants’ First Amendment 
rights were not violated.”202 
To summarize, plaintiffs must assert an actual chilling effect on their 
speech, not a potential one, to claim a First Amendment violation under 
FISA.  This requirement by courts is consistent with the longstanding princi-
ple of actual harm required for standing.  No First Amendment challenge to 
FISA has yet succeeded.  However, a plaintiff alleging injury-in-fact to her 
constitutional rights due to FISA may very well succeed.  To preserve con-
stitutional liberties, any legislation allowing surveillance to combat infor-
mation warfare should similarly allow lawsuits to challenge it based on in-
jury-in-fact. 
C.  The Link Between the First and Fourth Amendment 
A remaining question is whether FISA-like protections embedded in the 
legislation enabling surveillance to combat disinformation campaigns would 
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be sufficient to address First Amendment concerns.  Courts will likely hold 
that Fourth Amendment protections are adequate to protect First Amendment 
rights, as they have determined with regard to FISA.203  However, we argue 
that Fourth Amendment protections are insufficient to protect the First 
Amendment rights implicated in any surveillance necessary to combat disin-
formation campaigns. 
The First and Fourth Amendments both play an essential role in protect-
ing the civil liberties of USPERs.  Courts generally evaluate surveillance un-
der the Fourth Amendment, not the First Amendment.204  As a result, courts 
have found repeatedly that the satisfaction of Fourth Amendment require-
ments is sufficient to protect First Amendment rights in surveillance cases. 205  
For example, in the 1978 case of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,206 the Supreme 
Court held that procedural safeguards are unnecessary to protect First 
Amendment Rights in the context of search and seizure as long as Fourth 
Amendment requirements are satisfied.207  In Zurcher, a student newspaper 
alleged that a police search violated its First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights because the warrant’s scope was overly broad and the publication 
should not have been subject to a third-party search.208  Officers searched the 
newspaper’s office to retrieve photos it published about a violent protest in 
which none of the newspaper’s members were involved.209  The Court found 
that “[n]either the Fourth Amendment nor the cases requiring consideration 
of First Amendment values in issuing search warrants, however, call for im-
posing the regime ordered by the [d]istrict [c]ourt.”210  It held that First 
Amendment rights are protected where searches are subjected to a test of rea-
sonableness and a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.211  Thus, according 
to the Court, where government action meets the Fourth Amendment require-
ments, an individual’s First Amendment rights are adequately protected, and 
no further safeguards are needed.212 
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Surveillance to combat disinformation campaigns, however, is funda-
mentally different from a physical search of a newspaper’s offices.  First 
Amendment rights will be chilled if Americans believe their government can 
obtain a warrant to surveil their communications based only on probable 
cause.  If the government can obtain a warrant based on such a low standard, 
Americans will likely believe that the government will do so frequently.  This 
belief would make Americans more likely to self-censor their communica-
tions and to protest government actions.  The outcry after the surfacing of the 
National Security Agency’s haystack program illustrates this point.213  If 
Americans strongly opposed the idea of the National Security Agency col-
lecting their metadata in a haystack, then they would protest the concept of 
the government’s ability to easily surveil their online communications. Be-
cause of the high potential for chilling of speech, expression, and association, 
legislation regarding surveillance to combat disinformation campaigns must 
include additional protections for First Amendment rights.  Courts must de-
couple the First Amendment analysis from the Fourth Amendment analysis, 
and legislation must create additional safeguards for the First Amendment 
itself in this context. 
1.  The Warrant Requirement 
The government can meet both Fourth Amendment and First Amend-
ment requirements by obtaining a warrant to conduct surveillance to combat 
disinformation campaigns.  To do so, the government would follow require-
ments similar to those outlined in FISA.  Obtaining a warrant is the easiest 
way for the government to show that it has a compelling state interest in con-
ducting the requested surveillance and that the means of achieving that inter-
est are narrowly tailored.  A warrant request would require the government 
to state the target of the surveillance and provide evidence of a reasonable 
belief that the target presents a threat to national security.214  Thus, by com-
plying with FISA-like procedures—allowing prior judicial review of surveil-
lance for reasonableness and minimization procedures—the government will 
not violate the First Amendment.215  Prior judicial adjudication is exactly 
what the Supreme Court contemplated as adequate First Amendment protec-
tion: applying the Fourth Amendment with “scrupulous exactitude.”216  FISA 
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provides a model for new domestic surveillance laws that would require sim-
ilarly stringent application of Fourth Amendment requirements.217  The pro-
cedures and protections outlined in FISA are not sufficient, however.  Legis-
lation combatting disinformation should require additional safeguards given 
the First Amendment interests at stake. 
2.  Imposing New Warrant Requirements 
While Section 702 of FISA currently does not require a warrant for each 
collection in bulk data collections, especially for incidental collections, a 
modified warrant process for bulk data collections to combat information 
warfare would mitigate some of the criticism of Section 702 and better pro-
tect constitutional rights.218 
Section 702 of FISA has been criticized in the courts.  In United States 
v. Mohamud,219 the defendant, a USPER, argued that Section 702 violated 
the First and Fourth Amendment.220  The defendant’s “communications were 
collected incidentally during intelligence collection targeted at” non-
USPERs outside the United States.221  The defendant specifically challenged 
the breadth and vagueness of Section 702 surveillance, asserting it “chill[ed] 
Americans’ exercise of their First Amendment rights, causing many to 
change their habits in using the Internet and telephones.”222  The Ninth Cir-
cuit held, however, that the “district court correctly rejected [the defendant’s] 
First Amendment challenge, as motions to suppress based on First Amend-
ment violations are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.”223  Though the 
Ninth Circuit used the Fourth Amendment to analyze the alleged violation, it 
applied the “scrupulous exactitude” standards as ordained for First Amend-
ment concerns that arise in Fourth Amendment searches and surveillance.224  
To be precise, the Oregon federal district court judge held that Section 702 
FISA surveillance does not trigger the Warrant Clause because of prior case 
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law on foreign intelligence gathering.225  In the alternative, even if the War-
rant Clause is triggered, Section 702 falls within the foreign intelligence ex-
ception.226 
The analysis used in Mohamud is illuminating and provides lessons for 
new legislation to combat information warfare.  First, the defendant in Mo-
hamud contended that “the reasoning in Keith applies equally well to foreign 
national security surveillance, especially because of the First Amendment im-
plications in the seizure of phone calls and emails.”227  However, the Supreme 
Court stated that a special needs exception to the warrant requirement exists 
where, “beyond the normal need for law enforcement, . . . the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement [become] impracticable.”228  Among other Cir-
cuits, the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits recognized a foreign intelli-
gence exception on the basis that “the important national interest in foreign 
intelligence gathering justifies electronic surveillance without prior judicial 
review.”229  The FISC also held that the foreign intelligence exception applies 
to Section 702 surveillance.230  With this background, the Oregon federal dis-
trict court in Mohamud concluded that in “balanc[ing] the intrusion on the 
individual’s interest in privacy, namely the incidental collection of 
[USPERs’] communications, against these special needs when the govern-
ment targets a non-[USPER] believed to be outside the United States . . . the 
foreign intelligence exception applies and no warrant is required.”231 
After finding that the foreign intelligence exception applies to Section 
702, the Mohamud court turned to whether the government action is reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment.232  The district court applied a totality of 
the circumstances test,233 weighing “the promotion of legitimate governmen-
tal interests against the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an indi-
vidual’s privacy.”234  The court did “not find the lack of procedures associ-
ated with warrants ma[d]e [Section] 702 searches unreasonable under the 
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Fourth Amendment.”235  Rather, “the minimization procedures contribute to 
the reasonableness of [Section] 702 under the Fourth Amendment.”236 
Thus, the Mohamud court went through a two-step process in determin-
ing that FISA adequately protects First Amendment concerns by considering 
those concerns through a Fourth Amendment framework.  That is the court 
found, first, the foreign intelligence exception applies to FISA Section 702,237 
and, second, the government’s action under that exception was reasonable. 238 
However, bulk collection without a warrant leaves First Amendment 
values vulnerable.239  Fourth Amendment protections are weakened where no 
warrant is required.240  Without these Fourth Amendment safeguards, a sep-
arate First Amendment analysis becomes crucial to protect freedoms of 
speech, expression, and association.241  Any legislation to combat infor-
mation warfare should incorporate such an analysis. 
IV.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM FISA 
FISA’s particular First Amendment protections for USPERs can be a 
useful model for allowing the United States to surveil foreign agents without 
unduly infringing on the civil liberties of USPERs.  In particular, the statutory 
protections within FISA can, with some tailoring, properly address concerns 
about surveillance and potential intrusion on USPERs’ privacy, especially 
those engaging in disinformation campaigns intended to undermine the elec-
toral process.  Legislation should draw upon critiques of FISA to improve 
protections for constitutional liberties when developing programs or collect-
ing information to combat information warfare. 
At the outset, to protect the First Amendment, Congress should require 
procedures similar to FISA’s if open-source information is unavailing.  New 
legislation should maintain FISA’s high standards for allowing the collection 
of information on USPERs.  First, the government must obtain a court order 
or warrant.  Probable cause must not be based solely on a proposed target’s 
First Amendment activities.242  Second, the government must adopt and fol-
low minimization procedures to prevent misuse and retention of any 
USPERs’ data that they have incidentally collected.243  New legislation that 
relaxes surveillance restrictions on USPERs for the specific national security 
purpose of combatting information warfare must have regular and rigorous 
                                                        
 235.  Id. at *60. 
 236.  Id. at *64.  
 237.  See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 238.  Mohamud, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *60. 
 239.  Thistle, supra note 51, at 1227. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. at 1228.  
 242.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 243.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
   
142 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:114 
oversight by the Department of Justice, Congress, and the FISC, much like 
the oversight structure for FISA Section 702. 
In addition, case law involving FISA, discussed above, suggests further 
safeguards that Congress should incorporate into future legislation.  The sur-
veillance required to combat disinformation campaigns may meet the foreign 
intelligence exception but cannot rely on it entirely.  Any legislation to com-
bat information warfare through domestic surveillance should also contain a 
warrant requirement as additional protection for First Amendment rights.  
While the Fourth Amendment is necessary to protect First Amendment 
rights,244 compliance with the procedural requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment is insufficient to protect First Amendment expressive and associational 
rights of individuals subject to surveillance.  The First Amendment inquiry 
should thus be conducted separately from any Fourth Amendment require-
ments.  Because of the high potential for violation of First Amendment rights 
and a chilling effect on speech, the government should be required to put 
forward a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored to surveil a par-
ticular individual as to justify any intrusion on First Amendment rights. An 
all-encompassing interest in national security would be too broad.  The gov-
ernment should be required to articulate a specific national security interest 
that would require surveillance of a particular individual.  This would help 
avoid over-surveillance of Americans at large. 
A warrant is the simplest way for the government to show that it has a 
compelling state interest that would justify infringement on a First Amend-
ment right and that its proposed surveillance is narrowly tailored.245  The 
government can then allow a court to decide whether surveillance is reason-
able and whether the government has met FISA’s requirements or other cri-
teria.  A warrant would satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement and pro-
vide additional protections for First Amendment activity as well. 
Some might argue that obtaining a warrant would be too burdensome 
and restrictive on surveillance.  However, where First Amendment interests, 
as here, are incredibly implicated, requiring this level of judicial oversight is 
necessary for five reasons.  First, as with FISA, the government should be 
able to surveil for urgent national security purposes so long as it obtains an 
application for a warrant within seven days.  In this case, the government 
should follow minimization procedures to protect First Amendment rights.  
The government should still make a showing of a compelling state interest to 
conduct such surveillance that is narrowly tailored to achieve the specific na-
tional security objective.  The government would ideally present this showing 
before a committee or a special branch of the FISC that could provide expe-
dited review.246 
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Second, the analysis in Keith contemplates the balance between the gov-
ernment’s interest in national security and the privacy interests of 
USPERs.247  The court in Keith held that a neutral magistrate should issue a 
warrant instead of giving the executive branch sole discretion over domestic 
surveillance.248  Similar competing interests must be balanced when justify-
ing foreign surveillance.249  Since the fight against enemy information war-
fare will require both domestic and foreign surveillance, a warrant is neces-
sary to protect the Fourth and First Amendment rights of USPERs in either 
case. 
Third, USPERs’ First Amendment data should only be accessible for 
this specific national security purpose of fighting information warfare under 
this framework.250  Only particular agencies, such as Homeland Security, 
State, and Justice, should be able to collect USPERs’ information, and legis-
lation must create a specified process for the steps an agency must take to 
access that information.  This process would be similar to the certification 
process agencies currently undertake to obtain FISA orders.251 
Fourth, courts should emphasize minimization procedures that prioritize 
discarding and/or redacting USPER information except where “such person’s 
identity is necessary to understand” the information campaign.252  This infor-
mation, like upstream information, should be tagged, so agencies are alerted 
of its sensitive, First Amendment nature.  Further, the government should not 
retain any information collected to assess and thwart information campaigns 
designed to influence the electoral process beyond the electoral cycle at hand.  
After the electoral cycle is over, agencies may summarize their findings, but 
all USPERs’ data should be deleted or discarded within the shortest time pos-
sible, unless the agency can make a clear showing in a judicial body that it or 
another agency requires the data for an ongoing national security investiga-
tion.253 
Finally, to improve transparency and oversight, private companies 
should be permitted to disclose the number and type of government requests 
they receive.  The government should also report annually how it queries and 
                                                        
 247.  407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972). 
 248.  Id. at 317. 
 249.  Goldenziel & Cheema, supra note 8, at 120. 
 250.  Cf. Berman, supra note 89, at 76; see also LORETTA E. LYNCH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
EXHIBIT B: MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN 
CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 4 
(2016), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Minimization%20Proce-
dures%20used%20by%20NSA%20in%20Connection%20with%20FISA%20SECT%20702.pdf.  
 251.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h) (2012). 
 252.  Id. §§ 1801(h)(2), 1821(4)(B); In re All Matters Submitted to FISA, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 
618 (FISA Ct. 2002). 
 253.  Cf. Berman, supra note 89, at 77; [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], 2011 WL 
10945618, at *1, *21 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). 
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uses USPERs’ communications.  Congress and the courts must not abdicate 
their responsibility for providing oversight over electronic surveillance pro-
grams.  As the ease of surveillance grows and its use becomes more preva-
lent, safeguarding constitutional liberties becomes increasingly essential. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the fight against foreign information operations, the United States 
must reform its laws to ensure the integrity of the electoral process, while at 
the same time protecting civil liberties.  The current framework and protec-
tions of FISA are a product of several rounds of congressional amendment 
and national debate about how to balance critical national security interests 
and civil liberties.  While imperfect, FISA is a suitable reference and starting 
point for the development of any legislation countering information cam-
paigns: the warrant requirement, minimization procedures, certification pro-
cess, and transparency-creating measures all should characterize that legisla-
tion in order to protect civil liberties.  The United States must combat 
information warfare that challenges the foundations of American democracy.  
However, this fight cannot compromise the constitutional rights of USPERs. 
